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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of
institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external
effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency.  We focus on the
first element of the trade-off and on merger control.  We first point out that the current
framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of
jurisdiction.  We then consider various allocation of jurisdictions in a stylised model of
international merger control which attempts to capture the essential features of the objectives
being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the major jurisdictions.     We  find
that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts
actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives
that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue.    We also find that the allocation of
jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the final outcome.3
0. Introduction
A number of high profile cases have recently underlined potential conflicts between
countries in the implementation of antitrust rules.   For instance,  the EU commission decided
in 1991 to ban the acquisition of de Havilland , a Canadian company active in the regional
aircraft market by a French/Italian consortium (Aérospatiale/Alenia).   The Canadian antitrust
authorities however had allowed the deal to go through and both the French and Italian
government had expressed support.    This is thus an instance where two authorities reviewed
the same operation and where the most restrictive authority prevailed.   More recently, in
1997,  the merger between Mc Donnell-Douglas and Boeing  led to an important conflict
between US and EU antitrust authorities, which spilled over to their political masters.    This
merger was allowed by US authorities at a time when EU authorities were expressing serious
concerns.   The conflict escalated and a trade war was avoided at the last minute when the
parties accepted to modify their operation to satisfy the demands of the EU.      Another
serious conflict has arisen this spring when the European Court of Justice confirmed a
decision by the European Commission to ban the merger between Lonrho and Gencor, two
South African companies involved in the mining and processing of platinum.  The South
African antitrust authority has however  allowed the operation to go through.  Its Minister of
trade and industry has even officially provided support to the private parties in front of the
European Commission.
If the active enforcement of antitrust rules has been contentious, the lack of
enforcement has also been a source of concern.   For instance,  in the recent Kodak/Fuji case,
it has been alleged (by US authorities on behalf of Kodak) that the Japanese antitrust authority
(the Fair Trade Commission) had failed to implement its own legislation towards vertical
restraints in the distribution of photographic film in Japan.     As such failure to implement
domestic laws would have the effect of erecting an import barrier,  it has been the object of an
arbitration in the WTO.
These cases illustrate the existence of conflict in the implementation of competition4
policy among different jurisdictions and raise the issue of how such implementation should be
organised.  This question which had been much debated when merger control was (partially)
centralised in the EU has again become the focus of attention among policy makers, partially
in recognition of the fact that current attempts to reduce conflicts will not suffice 
1.
Most of the policy discussion has however focused on legal and institutional aspects.
From an economic point of view,  the organisation of international antitrust has been
discussed (see for instance, Bacchetta et al., (1997) or Neven et al., (1994))  as an issue of
institutional design,  with a trade-off between centralised  decision making at the level of a
supra-national organisation,  and  delegated decision making to lower levels of government at
the level of independent states.    The terms of such trade-off have been widely discussed in
public economics and applied to the area of antitrust (see for instance, Neven et al., (1994)).
  The benefits of centralisation usually consist primarily in the internalisation of economic
spillovers across national boundaries.   Indeed, independent regulators have an incentive to
take into account the effects of anti-competitive practice only in so far as they take place
within their own jurisdiction.   Hence,  if the geographical scope of the effects of an anti-
competitive practice is not included in a particular jurisdiction,  external effects will not be
taken into account.  A central agency, by contrast,  will ensure that all the effects of a
particular policy decision are taken into account and are not given differential consideration
according to the country on whose citizens they happen to fall.
      However, centralisation also has costs, notably the risk of making regulatory
policymakers more remote from the economies whose firms and consumers they influence by
their actions.   Accountability is another concern at the level of centralised agencies:
regulators who are unaccountable do not necessarily pursue the objectives they have been
assigned, but may simply use their discretion to favour particular interests (for reasons that
may be innocent or sinister). This lack of accountability may in turn be due to one or more of
several factors. First, citizens and voters may have less information about the operation of
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centralised institutions than about those of their own country or region, so there may be less
political pressure to ensure that these institutions function well.  Secondly, even with adequate
information, citizens and voters may have difficulty holding such institutions to account
because this relies on concerted action among all those affected, which is much harder to
achieve at a centralized level than for local or regional groups.   Admittedly, intermediate
levels of governments could sometimes substitute for voters and citizens and enhance the
accountability of centralised agencies.  For instance, the scrutiny of the EU Commission
decisions by Members states is, at least in some areas,   an important constraint on its
decisions.  Thirdly, holding centralized institutions to account is often difficult because it is
hard to see how alternative policies would function; one of the advantages of decentralization
is that "competition among regulators" provides some benchmark; it helps to reveal by
comparison the strengths and shortcomings of any particular system or set of policies
2.
Hence,   the political economy of central agencies differs in some important ways from that
found at  lower levels of government.  The presumption  that centralised agencies might be
more prone to capture is actually at the core of the principle of subsidiarity.
      Overall, then, centralisation is most appropriate when externalities across countries are
large relative to the risks of  enhanced "capture" of centralised institutions.   A  discussion of
international antitrust should thus consider both.   Neither have been given much attention in
the debate so far.   This paper will consider the first aspect, namely the extent to which
decentralised decision making will lead to inefficient decisions, because of external effects.
We first review the existing literature on the matter.
1. External effects across jurisdictions – existing literature
Head and Ries (1997) propose a model where jurisdiction is dependent on the location
of firms headquarters.  They consider international mergers with regulators which maximise
welfare (consumers surplus and the share of profits accruing to domestic citizens) and take
discrete decisions.  They focus on type II errors (situation where a merger is not banned even
though it would be by a central agency), which seems a priori surprising given that type II
errors are likely to be the least concern in the presence of multiple jurisdictions.    They
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confirm (proposition 1, p 1109) that if all countries affected by a merger have jurisdictions, no
merger which reduces global welfare will be allowed (type II errors will be nil).   They also
show, considering mergers which increase price,  that  type II errors will arise when no
country with jurisdiction represents a sufficient proportion of consumers  so that it will want
to block the merger.  The intuition behind this result becomes straightforward if one considers
an extreme case : consider two countries which each hosts one headquarter but no consumers
– which are all concentrated in a third country.  Clearly, the merger will not be blocked even
though it should be (at least if it does not involve efficiency benefits – so that the merger is
akin to a reduction in the number of firm – à la Salant et al).  More generally, it is clear that if
firms are not located where the consumers are, type II errors may be large (under the
allocation of jurisdiction assumed here).   Notice however that this result is highly dependent
on the objective function of the regulator (if he is not concerned about profit, all it takes is for
one consumer to be located within a jurisdiction to reduce type II errors to zero).
Rather than assuming that regulators maximise welfare, Barros and Cabral (1994)
adopt the framework of Farell and Shapiro (1990) and accordingly focus on the external effect
of a merger (the effect on consumers and competitors).   They are mostly concerned with a
possible merger between domestic firms and wonder whether a decision by a national
authority would be different from that of a global authority.  They confirm the presumption
discussed above namely that if a domestic economy is a reduced scale version of the broader
area (specifically if the share of  demand from the domestic economy is equal to its share of
supply),  decisions by domestic and global regulators will coincide.   However, if the share of
domestic demand exceeds the share of domestic supply, a domestic regulator will ban mergers
that a global regulators would allow (type I errors will emerge).    The reason is of course that
consumers (in their model) are always hurt by the mergers whereas the competitors of the
merging firms benefit.  Facing a more than proportional representation of consumers, it is not
a surprise that domestic regulators will be excessively strict.  Of course, the reverse will be
true as well  :  if the share of domestic supply exceeds the share of domestic demand in the
broader area, a domestic regulator will allow mergers that a global regulators would ban (type
II errors emerge).7
To summarise, the existing literature
3 suggests that the existence of a distortion will
depend on the distribution of gainers and losers within countries having jurisdiction relative to
that prevailing in the broader area.    This literature does not focus on the evaluation of
different  rules for the allocation of jurisdiction beyond the alternative  of a global regulator
versus one possible allocation of jurisdiction depending on the location of firm headquarters.
The example of international conflicts discussed above however suggest that  it may be useful
to consider more complex allocations of jurisdictions.    The outcome of decentralised
decision making will  indeed depend on the interaction between the independent regulators.
That is,  independent antitrust authorities will also compete through their decision.  The
strategic interactions between them will  affect the  final outcome but these interactions can
also be constrained by particular “rules of competition”.
In the existing literature, it is also assumed that the regulator maximise welfare or
considers external effects.     It would seem however that regulators interact with various
constituencies in taking their decisions and it may be useful to model these interactions
explicitly.
2. The international allocation  of jurisdiction
In the case of international antitrust, the main “rule” affecting competition between
independent authorities is the rule governing the assertion of jurisdiction  (see Neven and
Mavroidis, 1999 for a discussion of the issue).      Both the EU and the US now rely on the so
called “effects doctrine” such that a country asserts jurisdiction  when it is affected by a
particular practice ; for instance, the EU has asserted jurisdiction on US producers gathered in
an export cartel in the Wood pulp case because the effects of the cartels were felt in the
Community.   Recently, both the US and the EU have effectively extended the effects doctrine
to include situation where effects are only felt by domestic producers and not by consumers.
In 1992,  the United States promulgated a “Restatement” of  Guidelines on International
Antitrust enforcement, in which a footnote (footnote 159) was deleted.
4  Up to this point in
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time, the application of the US antitrust law was only applied when the interests of US
consumers were at stake.   It is now clear that these laws will also be applied when the
interests of US firms are affected.
The decision by the EC Commission on the Boeing/Mc Donnell-Douglass merger is
also revealing.    In this case, the EU  asserted jurisdiction, invoking as grounds, inter alia, the
damage that such a merger would cause to the major EC producer (and competitor of the two
merging firms) Airbus.    One can also argue that the remedies imposed by the EU
commission were only meant to protect the profits of Airbus.  Indeed,  the exclusive
agreements that Boeing had concluded with US airlines, which had to be cancelled for the
deal be allowed, would not affect the European Consumers but only the profits of Airbus.
Hence, it appears that in the current legal framework, independent jurisdiction can
easily assert their authority.  It will thus be particularly interesting to compare the outcomes
arising from such a simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction  to alternatives and in particular the
allocation of sole jurisdiction to a central authority.    In principle, it is unclear, how the
different rules for the allocation of jurisdictions will affect the outcome.     For instance,  is it
that the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction will enhance or reduce the probability of a
distortion in the presence of external effects  ?  (relative to the decision that would be taken by
a single regulator having global jurisdiction – and assuming for the time being that all
regulators have the same objective function).  One would expect that the simultaneous
assertion of jurisdictions would reduce type II errors,  i.e. the possibility that a practice is
allowed by all individual jurisdictions when it would not have been allowed by the global
regulator,  but increase type I errors, i.e. the possibility that a practice is banned by at least
one individual jurisdiction when it would have been allowed by the global regulator.
In the following section, we build a stylised model of merger control and investigate
how different rules to allocate jurisdictions will affect the outcome.
3.  A stylised model of international merger control
In this section, we investigate how different allocations of jurisdictions affect the9
outcome in a model of international merger control with external effects.   The objective of
this analysis is to evaluate the importance of the distortions that would arise in various
alternative scenarios about the allocation of jurisdictions.
As mentioned above, the assumption that regulators simply maximise welfare (or
consider external effects) is not satisfactory.   It is however beyond the scope of this paper to
build a model  which represents  the interactions between regulators and their constituencies
5.
In what follows, we thus build a stylised model of merger control which try to represent some
essential features of the approach which is adopted by the main antitrust authorities.
In particular, we will assume that the authorities first define the relevant market and
subsequently undertake an analysis of dominance.   Such an approach is by now fairly
standard in many jurisdictions and in particular in the main jurisdictions like the EU and the
US.    We will also assume that antitrust agencies simply carry out the task that they have
been assigned.   Since the implementation of the Merger guidelines in the EU, there has been
a remarkable convergence between the EU and the US in the formal objective that is assigned
to antitrust agencies towards mergers.    The formal standard is such that a merger should not
be allowed if it hurts consumers (and accordingly efficiency benefits should only be
considered if they are so large that, because of cost reductions, the price to consumers will not
increase).   Such an approach is clearly articulated in the US merger guidelines and in article 2
(b) of the merger regulation.  Accordingly, we will assume that antitrust authorities are only
concerned about consumers and, rather mechanically,  evaluate mergers relative to a
concentration threshold.
Consider a world with two countries, i=1,2 and a homogenous commodity.    There is
a collection of firms which can produce and sell in both countries.  We can leave the
competitive interactions between firms unspecified but simply assume that there is a pair of
equilibrium price – one for each country - before the merger takes place.
Assume that there is merger task force in each country which evaluates mergers by
first delineating the relevant market and subsequently deciding to allow or ban the merger on
the basis of the market share of the merging parties in the relevant market.  Specifically,10
assume the relevant is market is determined according the  SSNIP test – i.e. by asking
whether a hypothetical monopolist could increase price profitably  by x % above the
competitive level.
The extent to which a hypothetical monopolist who maximises profit would increase
price by x % is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand that it would face.  We
assimilate the profitable increase in price of the SSNIP test with the profit maximising
increase in price.  Hence, we assume that the relevant market can be determined by the
elasticity of demand.    If the elasticity of demand (evaluated at the competitive price- say ei)
is below  some benchmark (say K), market i will be considered to be relevant for the sake of
antitrust analysis.
 We assume that the elasticity in market 1 is lower than that of market 2, i. e.  e1 £ e2,
and that the difference in elasticity is associated with a difference in size (so that market 1 is
larger).   A demand model where these conditions are explicitly derived can be found in
Neven and Röller (1999).
It is important to note that in this framework different antitrust authorities could take different
views on the relevant market.   In particular, when   e1 <  K < e2, the antitrust authority in the
large market will decide that its own jurisdiction is a relevant market, whereas the antitrust
authority in market 2 will decide that its own jurisdiction is too small (a hypothetical
monopolist would not be able to profitably raise price) and hence will consider the
combination of the two markets as the relevant market for the analysis of dominance.
With respect to the analysis of dominance, we assume the simplest possible rule
namely that if the market share of the merging parties is higher than B, the merger is banned.
Otherwise, it is allowed.
Consider a merger between two firms which have a market share MSi in country i and
MSt in the overall market.  In principle, there are four possible allocations of jurisdiction:
either country could have sole jurisdiction, both countries could exercise jurisdictions
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simultaneously and finally a supra-national authority can have jurisdiction.    As indicated
above, individual countries can easily assert jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we focus on the
comparison between the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction and the exercise of authority
by a centralised agency.
We assume that when a merger is banned by a particular jurisdiction, it cannot take
place in a reduced form in another jurisdiction.  That is, we neglect the possibility of having
partial deals or remedies for particular jurisdictions.  This assumption tends to reinforce the
importance of external effects across jurisdictions and the prospect for conflicts.
There are three distinct parameter ranges to consider for the distribution of market
shares (i.e. MSi < B,  i = 1,2;   MSi > B,  i=1,2; MSi < B < MSj ) and for the elasticities which
delineate the relevant market (e1 > K, e1 < e2 < K and  e1 <  K < e2   ).   Hence there are nine
distinct ranges of  parameter.
Remark 1 :  If MSi < B,  i = 1,2, or MSi > B,  i = 1,2, then the allocation of jurisdiction does
not matter.   Furthermore, there is no conflict.
The reason is straightforward.  If the market share of the merging firms exceeds (falls short)
of the threshold in both market, then it will also exceed (fall short of) the threshold for the
overall market (MSt will be on the same side of the threshold as in the individual markets).
Hence, whatever the market definition  adopted by the authority in charge, the decision will
be the same.      For six cases (out of 9), the allocation does not matter.  There are three cases
left to consider.
Remark 2 :  If     e1 > K,  (and MSi < B < MSj  ) then the allocation of jurisdiction does not
matter.   Furthermore, there is no conflict.
The reason is as follows.  Whenever  e1 > K, then a competition authority in market 1 (the
large market) will conclude that the relevant market is the combination of both markets.12
Given that  e1 £ e2 ,  the competition authority in the small country will reach the same
conclusion.   As a consequence,  both authorities, as well as a supra-national authority will
consider MSt in the analysis of dominance.
When the relevant market is broad, the jurisdiction can actually be allocated to any
country which belongs to the relevant market.  The intuition behind this observation is that
any subset of  a relevant market is, from a competition point of view, a reduced scale version
of the broader market.
Hence, it appears that contrary to received wisdom,  “global” industries are not those
where the conflict between jurisdiction should arise!   The fact that conflicts actually often
arise in such industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust
authorities are not supposed to pursue (in the model as well as according to their statutes at
least for the US and the EU).   Conflict across jurisdictions may be essentially a matter arising
from the political economy of implementation and not from external effects.
There are thus two cases left to consider.   First, the case where    e1 < e2 < K  (and MSi
< B < MSj ) such that both antitrust authorities would conclude that  their own jurisdiction is a
relevant market and the case where  e1 <  K < e2   (and MSi < B < MSj )  such that there will
be a conflict over market definition.
Remark 3 :  If  e1 < e2 < K, and MSi < B < MSj ,  the allocation of jurisdiction does not matter.
Furthermore, there is always conflict.
In this case,  both national authorities (as well as a centralised agency) would
recognise that each country is a separate relevant market and  take a decision on the basis of
dominance in its own market.    One authority will always ban the merger (leading to a
conflict across countries).  Under a simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction, the merger will thus
be banned.   This outcome will also emerge if jurisdiction is given to a centralised authority
(which by assumption could not take separate decisions across relevant markets).13
We now consider the last case (e1 <  K < e2   and MSi < B < MSj) where there is a
conflict over the definition of the relevant market such that the authority in market 1 considers
its own market as relevant, whereas the authority in market 2 considers the combination of the
two markets as relevant.    In this case, the existence of conflict will depend on the actual
distribution of market shares in the two countries.    The type and likelihood of conflict that
may arise and its consequences for institution design are further analysed in Neven and Röller
(1999).   Regarding the allocation of jurisdiction, the following conclusion can be drawn.
Remark 4 :  If e1 <  K < e2   and MSi < B < MSj, the allocation of jurisdiction does not matter
if the centralised agency initiates the process of market definition from the large country.   If
the process of market definition starts from the smaller country, the allocation of jurisdiction
may matter.
Whenever a centralised agency initiates market definition from the large country, it
will evaluate dominance both in the large country and in the broader area.  Hence, the
outcome will coincide with the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction.     Furthermore, as
shown in Neven and Röller (1999),   conflict between national authorities will arise depending
on the distribution of market shares.   Of course, in the absence of conflict, the allocation of
jurisdiction will not matter.    In the presence of conflict,  if the central agency  initiates
market definition from the small country, it will take the same decision as country 2.   Then,
there is some parameter range for which the merger would be allowed (by the centralised
agency and country 2 – but not by country 1)  and hence where the outcome under a
centralised decision making will differ from that arising under a simultaneous assertion of
jurisdiction.   This precise conditions under which jurisdiction matters are derived in Neven
and Röller (1999).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of
institutional design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of14
external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency.  We focus
on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control.
The existing literature has considered potential distortions arising from decentralised
implementation of merger control and has highlighted the role of the distribution of gainers
and losers within the countries having jurisdiction relative to that prevailing in the broader
area.   Against this background, we first observe that the current framework of public
international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction.  We then consider
a stylised model of international merger control which attempts to capture the essential
features of the objectives being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the
major jurisdictions.
We observe that in our framework, the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly
little for the final outcome.  In particular, the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction and a
decision by a central agency will almost always lead to the same outcome.    We also find the
scope for conflict maybe smaller than what has been highlighted in the literature so far.   We
observe that when there is no issue about the allocation of profits, much of the scope for
conflict disappears.  In particular, when the relevant market encompasses all jurisdictions
concerned,  as would be the case in “global” industries,   conflict will only arise if antitrust
agencies pursue objectives that they are not supposed to pursue.15
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